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The Use of Political Conditionality in the EU’s 
Relations with Third Countries: How Effective?1
Karen Elizabeth Smith 
(Jean Monnet Fellow, 1996-1997,
Lecturer in International Relations, London School of Economics)
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a growing (but not fully 
established) consensus within the European Community (now Union) that 
applying political conditionality would allow it to encourage third countries to 
establish democracy and protect human rights. Trade agreements, cooperation 
and association agreements, aid, diplomatic recognition, and eventual EU 
membership have been made conditional on respect for human rights and 
democratic principles by the EU’s partners. The EU has apparently been 
playing a highly ’normative’ role, using its economic and diplomatic instruments 
to foster the spread of norms on human rights and democracy.
To analyze the effectiveness of the EU’s use of conditionality, two 
questions in particular must be answered. Firstly, by using conditionality, does 
the EU reach its objective of encouraging respect for human rights and 
democratic principles? Answering this, however, is difficult, and will not be 
attempted here. Some states may have been implementing democratic reforms 
or improving their human rights performance anyway, others may be
'This paper was presented at the European Community Studies Association 
(ECSA) International Conference, Seattle, 29 May-1 June 1997. The research 




























































































impervious to outside influence. The EU’s influence would have to be isolated 
from that of other international or domestic actors.
Before the first question can be fully answered, another question must be 
addressed. To what extent does the EU actually apply conditionality? The 
success of the EU’s attempts to encourage countries to respect human rights and 
democratize will, to a certain extent, depend on how consistently the EU 
actually follows its own pronouncements. Perceived inconsistency in the EU’s 
application of conditionality could diminish its influence. As a "first cut" at 
analyzing the effectiveness of conditionality, this paper will examine how far 
considerations of human rights and democracy have influenced the EU’s 
relations with third countries.
Trying to answer the second question raises two further issues. The first 
regards the EU’s "international actor capability", or its ability to function 
actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system.2 
For the EU to exercise influence in international affairs, the member states must 
agree on a common approach, and there must be consistency in the activities of 
the EU’s different decision-making frameworks (for trade and development 
policy, and foreign policy). This is clearly the case in applying conditionality, 
as it involves wielding the Community’s economic instruments (trade
2As "international actor" is defined by Gunnar Sjostedt in The Exter 




























































































concessions; aid; trade, cooperation, and association agreements) and diplomatic 
instruments (such as declarations and political dialogue) decided on in the 
framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Consistent use 
of conditionality by the EU requires that the decisions taken within the different 
frameworks, as well as the actions of the EU and the member states, do not 
contradict each other.
The other issue raised regards the role that considerations of human rights 
and democratic principles play in foreign policy in general. The end of the 
Cold War may have, as several observers have suggested, allowed Western 
states the opportunity to use aid and other instruments to pursue wider "milieu 
goals" such as fostering the spread of democracy, rather than to back 
authoritarian, anti-communist regimes/ But it is still evident that the 
application of conditionality competes with other considerations of foreign 
policy, such as commercial and geopolitical/strategic interests.* 4 Expecting 
human rights and democracy to appear always, or even regularly, at the top of
'See, for example: Olav Stokke, "Aid and Political Conditionality: Core 
Issues and State of the Art", in Olav Stokke, ed., Aid and Political 
Conditionality (London: Frank Cass, 1995), p. 9; and Joan Nelson, "Good 
Governance: Democracy and Conditional Economic Aid", in Paul Mosley, ed., 
Development Finance and Policy Reform: Essays in the Theory and Practice of 
Conditionality in Less Developed Countries (Houndmills. Macmillan, 1992), p. 
309.
4Sec Peter R. Baehr, The Role of Human Rights in Foreign Policy 




























































































the EU’s foreign policy priorities is unrealistic. But as R.J. Vincent noted:
finding its place in the empire of circumstance is more damaging 
to human rights policy than it might be to other items of foreign 
policy, because it can be argued that it is on the substance and 
appearance of even-handedness that a successful human rights 
policy depends.5
Of course, as realists would maintain, considerations of human rights may 
simply mask other interests.6 One of the criticisms of applying conditionality 
in aid allocation is that donors do so in their own interests, rather than those of 
the people of the developing countries.7 But there is also the liberal argument 
that democracies do not go to war with each other; thus promoting such norms 
will contribute to international peace and stability, which is in the interests of
SR.J. Vincent, "Human Rights in Foreign Policy", in Dilys Hill, ed., 
Human Rights and Foreign Policy: Principles and Practice (Houndmills: 
Macmillan, 1989), p. 58.
6E.H. Carr argued that so-called universal principles are really the 
"unconscious reflexions of national policy based on a particular interpretation 
of national interest at a particular time." In The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919- 
1939 (London: Macmillan, 1946), p. 87. Echoing this argument, Asian and 
Islamic countries have claimed that "international" ideas of human rights are 
really Western ideas. See Mahmood Monshipouri, Democratization. 
Liberalization and Human Rights in the Third World (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 
1995), pp. 17-19.
\  ' 'John-Jean B. Barya has argued that political conditionality is designed to 
^ i la c e  socialism with the ideology of free enterprise worldwide, create a new 
source of legitimacy for hegemony, and justify the decline of resource flows to




























































































The way in which the EU applies conditionality could thus reveal the 
significance of norms* 9 or "principled beliefs" and "causal beliefs"10 in its 
foreign policy. Conditionality is itself a norm, a standard of behavior, that 
"competes" with other interests. If only weak states suffer from the imposition 
of conditionality, while more important states do not, then economic and/or 
strategic interests "trump" the norm of conditionality. If conditionality serves 
as an excuse to break ties, then perhaps the realists are right (though proving 
this would be very difficult). However, it is nonetheless significant that human 
rights and democratic principles have been accorded such a prominent position 
in the EU’s foreign policy objectives. The norm of conditionality has made 
"new types of action possible, while neither guaranteeing action nor determining
the EU and its member states.8
“The June 1991 Luxembourg European Council declared: "Tensions and 
conflicts arising from flagrant and systematic violations of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in one country or in a specific region are often a threat , 
to international peace and security." "Declaration on Human Rights" in EC 
Bulletin no. 6, 1991, pt. 1.45.
9Norms are "shared (thus social) understandings of standards for behavior." 
Audie Klotz, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), p. 14.
'“Principled beliefs are "normative ideas that specify criteria for 
distinguishing right from wrong and just from unjust." Causal beliefs "provide 
guides for individuals on how to achieve their objectives." Judith Goldstein and 
Robert Keohane, "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework", in 
Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign policy: Beliefs. 






























































































The first section of this paper will further define political conditionality 
and discuss some of the problems that arise with its use. The second section 
will review how conditionality came to be adopted by the Union. The way in 
which the EU has implemented conditionality will be discussed in the third
section.
I. What is political conditionality?
Political conditionality entails the linking, by a state or international 
organization, of perceived benefits to another state (such as aid, trade 
concessions, cooperation agreements, political contacts, or international 
organization membership), to the fulfillment of conditions relating to the 
protection of human rights and the advancement of democratic principles.* 12
“Positive conditionality can be loosely defined as promising the benefit(s) to a
&>
state if it fulfills the conditions; negative conditionality involves reducing, 
suspending, or terminating those benefits if the state in question violates the
"Ronald Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter Katzenstein, "Norms, 
Identity, and Culture in National Security", in Peter Katzenstein, ed., The 
Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 56.
l2Economic conditionality links benefits to the fulfillment of economic 
conditions, usually involving the introduction of a market economy or specific 
economic policies (e.g. structural adjustment). In the interests of brevity, 




























































































conditions.n CX'V 6 S
Conditionality has been criticized as illegitimate interference in the 
domestic affairs of other states, as a challenge to state sovereignty. Counter to 
this is the conviction that human rights are universal principles and that the 
spread of democracy makes manifest its universal appeal. Well over 100 states 
have ratified the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, and 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Therefore, as the European Council has 
declared, "expressing concern about violations of human rights, as well as 
requests designed to secure those rights, cannot be considered as interference 
in the internal affairs of a State".* 14
That the EU is applying "multilateral" conditionality (in that fifteen 
member states have to agree to do so) may be considered more acceptable and 
legitimate than conditionality applied by a single state. Member states can also 
thus escape responsibility for reducing or suspending aid, for example. 
However, conditionality applied by the EU could be criticized on other grounds, 
because the EU itself suffers from a lack of democracy and does not have its
"For definitions, see: Hugo Storey, "Human Rights and the New Europe: 
Experience and Experiment", in David Bcetham, ed., Politics and Human 
Rights (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), p. 134; Joan Nelson, Encouraging 
Democracy: What Role for Conditioned Aid?. Policy Essay no. 4 (Washington, 
DC: Overseas Development Council, 1992), p. 9; and Stokke 1995, pp. 11-13.




























































































own "bill of rights".15
Apart from gross violations of human rights or clear reversals in the 
democratization process, judging whether a country has met the criteria is bound 
to be highly subjective. Which human rights and democratic principles are to 
be considered the most important? As Peter Uvin has asked: What is the 
minimum degree of democratization required to fulfill the set conditions? 
Which human rights are to be respected as a matter of priority?16 * What should 
happen if a country makes improvements in one area, but relapses in another? 
Setting specific guidelines, however, means that the same standards are to be 
applied to all of the EU’s partners, even though different factors might need to 
be taken into account in different cases.
A similar problem arises from grouping together human rights and 
democratic principles. One observer has charged that frequently "human rights" 
are reduced to "democracy", which is further reduced to multi-party elections. 
But new democracies may not be able to guarantee human rights; majority rule 
/can also result in the denial of equal rights to minorities.1'
l5The 1997 Draft Treaty of Amsterdam does contain stronger provisions on 
the respect for fundamental rights in the EU.
l6Peter Uvin, "Do As I Say, Not As I Do: The Limits of Political 
Conditionality", in Georg Sorensen, ed.. Political Conditionality (London: Frank
Cass, 1993), p. 70.
‘’Katarina Tomasevski, Development Aid and Human Rights Revisited 



























































































Even if agreement exists that human rights and democratic principles are 
legitimate considerations for foreign policy (a principled belief), there could still 
be debate as to how best to promote those principles (a causal belief).1* 
Conditionality may not be the best way to promote democracy and protection 
of human rights: it could be more effective to strengthen economic and political 
links with the country concerned, thus engendering a process of internal change. 
Cutting off development aid or trade links to poor countries in particular might 
only worsen the situation (it could punish the population "for the sins of their 
rulers."* 19). This is essentially what has been called the dilemma between 
strategies of "asphyxiation" (blocking economic flows inhibits or halts bad 
behavior) and "oxygen" (economic activity leads to positive political 
consequences).20 As will be discussed in section III, this dilemma appears 
frequently in the EU’s application of conditionality.
II. Building an EU Consensus on Conditionality
The Community/Union really began to use conditionality in its relations 
with third countries only with the end of the Cold War in Europe. Human
'*Sec Kathryn Sikkink, "The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights 
Policies in the United States and Western Europe", in Goldstein and Keohane, 
eds. 1993, pp. 141-142.
19As Tomasevski 1993 argues.
20Franklin L. Lavin, "Asphyxiation or Oxygen? The Sanctions Dilemma", 




























































































rights and democracy, though, had been a major consideration in the 
Community’s relations with Greece, Portugal and Spain, not yet liberal 
democracies but still part of the "West": the three were not eligible for 
Community membership until after they launched democratization.21 But the 
Community and its member states generally considered it more important to 
maintain trade ties and detente with their neighbors in eastern Europe, as a way 
of encouraging liberalization, than to threaten to cut off those links if 
improvements in human rights and political freedoms were not made (which 
was, broadly speaking, the US approach).
Still less did conditionality affect the Community’s relations with 
developing countries (most notably, in the framework of the Lomé convention, 
which now links the Community with 70 African, Caribbean, and Pacific, or 
ACP, countries).22 The Community’s development aid was supposed to be 
non-political, its relations with the ’Third World’ free of vestiges of colonialism 
and distinct from the superpowers.21 The first two Lomé conventions (1975-
2'Thc April 1978 European Council declared that "respect for and 
maintenance of representative democracy and human rights in each Member 
State are essential elements of membership in the European Communities." In 
"Declaration on Democracy", Copenhagen European Council, 7-8 April 1978, 
EC Bulletin no. 3, 1978, p. 6.
22The Community did impose limited negative measures on South Africa in 
1985 and 1986, and an arms embargo and some diplomatic and economic 
sanctions on China following the Tianenmen Square events of June 1989.




























































































1980 and 1980-1985) did not refer at all to human rights, partly because the 
ACP countries opposed any attempt to provide aid with political conditions 
attached. Following the atrocities of Idi Amin in Uganda in the mid-1970s, the 
Community did agree that measures should be taken if an ACP state 
systematically violated fundamental human rights.* 24 And at the Community’s 
insistence, the Lomé III agreement (1985-1990) contains a joint declaration 
reiterating that human dignity is an essential objective of development.25
The Community’s approach to human rights was criticized by the 
European Parliament (EP). Since 1983, the EP has adopted an annual report 
and resolution on human rights in the world, in which it reviews Community 
activities. The EP repeatedly requested that the Commission consider how to 
link EC aid with minimum conditions of human rights protection, and to build 
human rights considerations into development programs and external
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 102.
240n 21 June 1977, the Council stated that EC development aid to Uganda 
would not reinforce or prolong the deprivation of fundamental rights there. EC 
Bulletin no. 6, 1977, pt. 2.2.59. In November 1979, the Council agreed that if 
a party to the Lomé convention systematically violated human dignity and basic 
human rights, it would examine the measures to be taken as a result. Agence 
Europe no. 2793, 21 November 1979.
25Michael K. Addo, "Some Issues in European Community Aid Policy and 




























































































agreements.26 But the Commission initially rebuffed the EP’s proposal to draft 
agreements so that sanctions could be imposed if human rights were violated, 
preferring to emphasize the promotion of human rights.27 With the entry into 
force of the Single European Act in 1987, the EP gained the power to approve 
association agreements and membership applications. It then used this power to 
press for consideration of human rights. In 1987 and 1988, it refused to give 
its assent to financial protocols with Turkey and Israel, over human rights 
concerns.
The EP’s pressure generated some response. In May 1986, the Dutch 
presidency submitted a memorandum to the EP on action taken in EPC in the 
field of human rights, since the last Dutch presidency in 1981.28 The EPC
26As in EP Resolution for the year 1983/1984 on human rights in the world 
and Community policy on human rights, in OJ C 172, 2 July 1984, p. 38. Each 
year the EP also approves over a hundred resolutions on human rights violations 
all over the world. See Group of the European People’s Party of the European 
Parliament, Dossier: European Parliament and Human Rights (Luxembourg: 
European Centre, Kirchberg, 1989), and European Parliament Directorate 
General for Research and the Human Rights Unit, The European Parliament and 
Human Rights (Luxembourg: OOPEC, 1994).
27Andrew Clapham, Human Rights and the European Community: A Critical 
Overview (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1991), p. 74, and Marcel 
Zwamborn, "Human Rights Promotion and Protection through the External 
Relations of the European Community and the Twelve", Netherlands Quarterly 
of Human Rights, vol. 7, no. 1, 1989, p. 19.
^"Letter to the President of the European Parliament: Memorandum on EPC 
and Human Rights", Document no. 86/137, in European Political Cooperation 
Documentation Bulletin, vol. 2, no. 1, 1986. The Netherlands had, in 1979, 




























































































Presidency has since submitted an annual written report to the EP. On 21 July 
1986, a declaration of the foreign ministers (meeting in the EPC and Council 
frameworks) reaffirmed "their commitment to promote and protect human rights 
and fundamental freedoms".29 But the ministers did not declare how they 
would carry out that commitment, beyond declaratory diplomacy.30
Conditionality developed first and furthest with respect to Central and 
Eastern Europe, with the end of the Cold War. By wielding its economic and 
political instruments on a conditional basis, the Community hoped to encourage 
its eastern neighbors to carry out reforms. The success of the economic and 
political transformation in Central and Eastern Europe has been considered 
crucial for ensuring long-term stability and security in Europe.
In 1988-1989, the Community began to apply conditionality in its relations j 
with the Central and East European countries (CEECs), but conditionality was 
not yet set out in legal instruments. It first used trade and cooperation 
agreements to encourage political reforms. Countries that were further ahead i  
in the reform process (Hungary, Poland) were accorded more beneficial *2
1994, chapter 11. Denmark and other Scandinavian states had also adopted an 
external human rights policy.
^"Declaration on Human Rights", EPC Documentation Bulletin, vol. 2, no.
2, 1986.
"The Dutch Presidency’s memorandum to the European Parliament noted 
that between 1981 and 1986, between 90 and 100 démarches on human rights 




























































































treatment. If a country did not respect human rights (Bulgaria, Romania), the 
EC withheld the prospect of an agreement. Aid was provided only if the 
countries were committed to political and economic reforms. But conditionality 
was not mentioned in the regulations setting up the Community’s aid program 
(PHARE).’'
In 1990, the Community agreed to conclude association agreements 
(known as "Europe" agreements) with CEECs that met five conditions: the rule 
of law, human rights, a multi-party system, free and fair elections, and a market 
economy. The first three Europe agreements signed, with Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, and Poland (in December 1991), do not contain any reference to 
conditionality. But on 11 May 1992, the Council decided that all cooperation 
and association agreements concluded with CSCE member states should contain 
a clause permitting the suspension of the agreements if human rights and 
democratic principles are not respected.’2 The trade and cooperation 
agreements concluded with Albania (1992), the Baltic states (1993), and
"Regulations no. 3906/89 in OJ L 375, 23 December 1989, and no. 
2698/90 in OJ L 257, 21 September 1990. The same is true for the EC’s 
program to assist reforms in the former Soviet Union (TACIS): only the most 
recent regulation (1996) specifically states that action can be taken if human 
rights and democratic principles are not respected. Regulations no. 2157/91 in 
OJ L 201, 24 July 1991, no. 2053/93 in OJ L 187, 29 July 1993, and no. 
1279/96 in OJ L 165, 4 July 1996.
" EC Bulletin no. 5, 1992, pt. 1.2.12. Without the human rights clause, 
suspension would have to be justified on other grounds, and in accordance with 




























































































Slovenia (1993) contain such a clause, as do the Europe agreements concluded 
after that date (with Bulgaria, Romania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, the three 
Baltic states, and Slovenia)."  Likewise, the partnership and cooperation 
agreements (signed since 1994) with former Soviet republics contain the clause.
The May 1992 decision on the human rights clause follows two 
declarations, by the European Council in June 1991 and the Development 
Council in November 1991, in which the intention to include clauses on human 
rights in Community agreements with third countries is stated (see below).14 
But the decision also needs to be seen in another context. It was taken when the 
Council approved the negotiating mandates for Europe agreements with Bulgaria 
and Romania: this in turn followed the decision in August 1991 (in the wake of 
the attempted Soviet coup) to expand cooperation with those two countries, 
Albania, and the newly recognized Baltic republics. Geopolitical concerns rather 
than a positive appraisal of the political situation in those countries led to the 
development of relations. The decision on the human rights clause could
"The trade and cooperation agreements with Albania, Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania contained a clause which allowed for the immediate suspension of the 
agreement. This was replaced in later agreements by a clause which allows for 
measures to be taken only after consultations take place, and priority is to be 
given to keeping the agreement operational wherever possible. European 
Commission, "On the Inclusion of Respect for Democratic Principles and 
Human Rights in Agreements between the Community and Third Countries", 
COM (95) 216 final, 23 May 1995.





























































































indicate that Bulgaria and Romania did not fully meet the established criteria for 
Europe agreements and thus the Community had to retain some leverage to 
encourage political and economic reforms. Nonetheless, it also set a precedent 
that agreements could be suspended for violations of human rights and 
democratic principles.
The recognition of new states emerging with the disintegration of 
communist federations was also supposed to depend on the fulfillment of certain 
conditions. In December 1991, the Community and the member states adopted 
criteria for recognizing new states in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, 
which included respect for CSCE principles of the rule of law, democracy, and 
human rights, and guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and 
minorities.1'’ Finally, the June 1993 Copenhagen European Council agreed that 
the CEECs could join the Union once they satisfied certain conditions, including 
stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights 
and respect for and protection of minorities.'6
Conditionality has been extended to the Community/Union's relations with 
other third countries. By the late 1980s, the Community could press more
Declaration on the 'Guidelines on the Recognition ol New States in 
Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union’", EPC Press Release P. 128/91, 16 
December 1991.
'"European Council in Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993, Conclusions of the 




























































































successfully for the inclusion of references to human rights in Lomé: democratic 
movements were spreading throughout the developing world (often because of 
popular resistance to structural adjustment programs) and economic conditions 
in the ACP states were worsening (which made them more dependent on foreign 
aid).’7 Lomé IV, signed in 1989, was the first external agreement to have a 
reference to human rights inserted into the text, rather than the preamble. 
Article 5 states that development entails respect for and promotion of human 
rights, and that the parties reiterate their attachment to human dignity and 
human rights. But there was no legal basis for responding to human rights 
violations.
In June 1991, the Luxembourg European Council issued a declaration on 
human rights, which contained the usual affirmation that "[t]he Community and 
its Member States undertake to pursue their policy of promoting and 
safeguarding human rights and fundamental freedoms throughout the world." 
But how human rights could be promoted was also indicated: clauses on human 
rights could be included in economic and cooperation agreements with third 
countries. “
The Maastricht Treaty (agreed in December 1991) reflects the extent to
"Demetrios James Marantis, "Human Rights, Democracy, and 
Development: The European Community Model", in Harvard Human Rights 
Journal, vol. 7, spring 1994, p. 8.




























































































which considerations of human rights and democracy are supposed to influence 
the EU’s foreign relations. One of the CFSP’s objectives is to develop and 
consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms (article J. 1). The provisions on development cooperation 
state that Community policy shall help develop and consolidate democracy and 
the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (article 
130u).
On 28 November 1991, the Development Council agreed that 
considerations of human rights and democracy should be important elements in 
the Community’s relations with developing countries.'9 The Community "will 
give high priority to a positive approach that stimulates respect for human rights 
and encourages democracy", but "in the event of grave and persistent human 
rights violations or serious interruption of democratic processes, the Community 
and its Member States will consider appropriate responses in the light of the 
circumstances, guided by objective and equitable criteria." Human rights 
clauses were to be included in future cooperation agreements with developing 
countries.
Following this declaration, cooperation agreements concluded with Latin 
American and Asian states included a clause which states that respect for human
. ^Resolution of the Council and of the Member States meeting in the Council 





























































































rights and democratic principles are "essential elements" of the agreements. But 
none of these agreements provide for suspension or denunciation in case of 
violations of these principles.40
On 29 May 1995, the Council agreed that all agreements with third 
countries would contain a suspension mechanism in addition to the essential 
elements clause, enabling the Community to react in the event of violation of 
essential elements of the agreements, particularly human rights and democratic 
principles.41 Lomé IV, amended in November 1995 following a mid-term 
review, states that respect for human rights and democratic principles are 
essential elements of the convention and includes a suspension clause (article 
366a) which envisages the partial or full suspension of the convention to a state 
party that fails to fulfill obligations in respect of the essential elements. The 
suspension clause institutionalizes a practice already established, as European *4
"'Some agreements (concluded between 1990 and early 1992) contain a 
clause stating that relations of cooperation are founded on respect for democratic 
principles and human rights, but this is not the same as the "essential elements" 
clause. For a list of the references to human rights in the Community’s 
agreements with third countries, see Annex 3, COM (95) 216 final.
4'E l.1 Bulletin no. 5, 1995, pt. 1.2.3. The EP has called for including social 
rights in the clause (EP Resolution on the introduction of a social clause in the 
unilateral and multilateral trading system, in OJ C 61, 28 February 1994). 
Under the new rules on the Generalised System of Preferences (Regulation no. 
3281/94, in OJ L 348, 31 December 1994), additional preferences will be 
provided to countries that apply ILO conventions on freedom of association and 
child labor, from I January 1998. Preferences can be withdrawn if a state 




























































































Development Fund (EDF) aid had already been suspended in several ACP 
countries (see section III).42 The clause will also allow, however, the 
suspension of trade preferences.43
Conditionality has been extended to aid to non-ACP countries. A 
February 1992 regulation on assistance to developing countries in Asia and 
Latin America states that the Community could amend or suspend cooperation 
with states that violate human rights and democratic principles. Increased 
support could be given to countries most committed to the respect for human 
rights and democratic principles.44 The 1996 MEDA regulation (on financial 
measures for the Mediterranean countries) states that respect for democratic 
principles and human rights is an essential element of the relationship, and 
violation of it would justify adoption of appropriate measures.4 ’
42EDF is outside the EU budget and provides the bulk of EU assistance to 
ACP countries.
4'Karin Arts, "Implementing the Right to Development'.’ An Analysis of 
European Community Development and Human Rights Policies”, in Peter 
Baehr, Lalaine Sadiwa, and Jacqueline Smith, eds.. Human Rights in 
Developing Countries Yearbook 1996 (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
1996), pp. 60-61.
“Council Regulation no. 443/92, in OJ L 52, 27 February 1992. It should 
be noted that at the time, the PHARE and TACIS regulations did not contain 
such a clause.
“ Earlier regulations on aid to the Mediterranean countries did not contain 
this clause. See Regulations no. 1762/92 and 1763/92 in OJ L181, 1 July 1992, 




























































































III. Conditionality in Practice
Within the EU, then, there does seem to be widespread agreement that 
promotion of human rights and democratic principles are a legitimate objective 
of foreign policy, and that conditionality is one way of achieving that objective. 
How and to what extent is conditionality applied?
In the EU’s application of conditionality, positive measures are preferred,
and negative measures de-emphasized. Sanctions, including the suspension of
agreements, are to be imposed only as a last resort.
The Community approach is geared to the principle that 
international cooperation must focus especially on positive 
measures providing incentives for the promotion of democracy and 
human rights; the use of sanctions should be considered only if all 
other means have failed.44
Positive measures are preferable to sanctions for several reasons. They 
help to establish the conditions under which democratic principles and human 
rights can be protected. Such measures seem to challenge sovereignty less than 
sanctions do. Donors are less likely to be inconsistent in applying positive 
measures than negative ones.47
The EU’s positive measures include granting increased aid to countries
4,’European Commission, "On the Implementation in 1993 of the Resolution 
of the Council and of the Member States meeting in the Council on human 
rights, democracy and development, adopted on 28 November 1991 ", COM (94) 
42 final, 23 February 1992, p. 11.




























































































that are making progress in promoting human rights and democratic reforms. 
The November 1991 resolution on human rights, democracy, and development, 
for example, envisaged "the possibility of increased assistance to developing 
countries in which substantive positive changes in human rights and democracy 
have taken place."
The top 20 recipients of official Community development assistance are 
listed in table 1. While only a superficial analysis can be attempted here, the 
table does suggest several interesting developments.4li The decline of Kenya, 
Malawi, Sudan, Togo and Zaire corresponds to decisions in the early 1990s to 
suspend aid to those countries because of human rights violations and problems 
in democratization (see below). Likewise, the rise of South Africa, Burkina 
Faso, and Zambia coincides with positive evaluations of the political situation 
in those countries.49
Part of the problem with relying on positive conditionality is that the EU’s 
resources are necessarily limited: it is unlikely that aid allocations would
4*A list of the major recipients in itself, though, does not provide much 
information about the application of conditionality. For example, humanitarian 
reasons (delivery of aid) account for the primary position of the former 
Yugoslavia in 1993/1994. As I have not yet seen decisions taken on the 
allocation of the 8th EDF, it is too early to tell the extent to which aid has been 
re allocated to countries implementing political reforms.
J9See the CFSP joint action on support for the transition in South Africa, in 
OJ L 316, 17 December 1993. For the positive evaluations, see European 
Commission, Directorate General for Development, EU-ACP Cooperation in 




























































































increase substantially in any event. But if positive conditionality is really to be 
applied, then we should expect to see further significant changes in the amounts 
allocated to states, based on their human rights and democracy situation.
Table 1: 20 major recipients of Community aid disbursements
1983/1984 1988/1989 1993/1994






Ghana Kenya Cote d ’Ivoire
Tanzania Egypt Tanzania
Turkey Sudan South Africa
Morocco Zaire Nigeria
Madagascar China Zimbabwe
Malt Tanzania Palestinian Adm. Areas







Papua New Guinea Mali Angola
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
Development Assistance Committee, "The European Community". Development 
Co-operation Review Series, no. 12, 1996, p. 56.
Aid is also specifically earmarked for helping countries carry out 




























































































quite small. Between 1992 and 1994, there were separate lines in the EC 
budget for financing activities in several regions. In 1994, at the EP’s request, 
all the headings were gathered in one budget chapter, the European Initiative for 
Democracy and Protection of Human Rights. In 1994, ECU 59.1 million was 
allocated for the initiative (compared with ECU 45.1 million for aid in 1993).50 
In addition, the EDF can finance activities to promote human rights and 
democracy that are initiated by the ACP countries.51
EU aid for democracy and protection of human rights is to be spent on 
three priority areas: 1) operations linked with the exercise of public authority, 
which includes operations to strengthen the rule of law (such as support for 
parliaments and the judiciary) and to support consultation of population 
(referenda, elections); 2) operations to strengthen civil society (support for non­
governmental organizations); and 3) support for vulnerable groups (such as 
torture victims and minorities).5-1
Positive conditionality can also entail holding out the promise of benefits
'“European Commission, "Report on the Implementation of Measures 
Intended to Promote Observance of Human Rights and Democratic Principles 
(for 1994)", COM (95) 191 final, 12 July 1995, p. 3. Compare these figures 
with the general aid allocations: almost ECU 13 billion for the 8th EDF (1996- 
2000); and for 1995-1999, ECU 6.7 billion for PHARE, ECU 2.7 billion for 
TACIS, and ECU 4.7 billion for the Mediterranean non-member countries.
' ' EU-ACP Cooperation in 1994. p. 7. Funds can also be taken from other 
allocations for technical assistance and cooperation. Com (95) 191 final, p. 4.




























































































if the country concerned meets certain conditions. This is already a well- 
established practice. In December 1996, for example, the EU promised to 
negotiate a cooperation agreement with Cuba if the Cuban authorities make 
progress towards democracy.5' In May 1997, the Council stated that the 
development of relations with the former Yugoslavia is linked to conditions on 
democracy, human rights and regional cooperation. Negotiation and conclusion 
of agreements can then be delayed, if need be, as happened when the 
negotiations on trade and cooperation agreements with Romania and Bulgaria 
were suspended in 1989 because of concerns about human rights abuses 
there."
Positive conditionality, though, is not always applied consistently. The 
recognition of the Yugoslav republics as independent states was also promised 
if certain conditions were met. But Croatia was recognized anyway (even 
though a specially-instituted commission had decided that it did not meet the 
conditions), and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was not (even 
though the commission had ruled that it did meet the conditions). Clearly, the 
concerns of separate member slates (Germany in the first case and Greece in the 
second) prevented the Community from following its own agreed guidelines.
"CFSP Common Position on Cuba, in OJ L 322, 12 December 1996.
"The delay can be instigated by the Commission, Council, or the European 
Parliament (which, for example, delayed the recent customs union with Turkey 




























































































Algeria and the EU are currently engaged in discussions about concluding an 
association agreement, although human rights violations are still being 
committed there.
Positive measures are an inadequate response to gross violations of human 
rights or clear reversals in the democratic process. But negative measures are 
controversial for several reasons. They do not address the causes of violations 
of human rights, and can even worsen the situation. The assumption is that 
governments can and are able to respond to outside pressure, but they may not 
be able to. Sanctions can antagonize states and hurt the population, or cause it 
to rally to the government’s support.55
In response to violations of human rights and democratic principles, the 
EU can:
deliver confidential or public demarches;
change the content of cooperation programs or channels used;
defer signatures or decisions needed to implement cooperation;
reduce cultural, scientific, technical cooperation programs;
defer holding a joint committee meeting;
suspend high-level bilateral contact;
postpone new projects;
refuse to act on a partner’s initiative;
impose trade embargoes (sanctions);
suspend arms sales and military cooperation; or
suspend cooperation with states concerned.5'’
55Marantis 1994, pp. 12-14.





























































































Negative measures are to be decided according to three principles: they 
should be guided by objective and equitable criteria; they must be appropriate 
to the circumstances and proportional to the gravity of the case; and they must 
not penalize the population, and particularly the poorest people (therefore 
official cooperation could be interrupted with the government, but aid would 
continue to be channeled to the population).57 There are, however, no hard and 
fast guidelines on what the appropriate level of response is to be to a given 
situation. It is clear that the ELI treats different partners differently, for reasons 
that are not always related to considerations of human rights and democracy.
In 1995, the EU delivered approximately seventy démarches and 
published sixty declarations on human rights situations.* 5* In addition, the EU 
has introduced resolutions on human rights in specific situations to the Third 
Committee of the UN General Assembly and the UN Commission on Human 
Rights. But while CFSP démarches and declarations condemn the behavior of
''Commission Communication, "Rapport sur la mise en oeuvre de la 
résolution du conseil et de ses états membres sur les droits de l’homme, la 
démocratie et le développement du 28 novembre 1991", SEC (92) 1915 final, 
21 October 1992.
5*According to the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, "Annual 
Memorandum to the European Parliament on the Activities of the European 
Union in the Field of Human Rights, 1995", document no. 5468/96, 19 June 
1996, p. 5. In 1992-1993, the figures were over 140 approaches and démarches, 
and 60 declarations. "Annual Memorandum to the European Parliament on the 
Activities of the Community and its Member States in the field of Human 
Rights", Document no. 93/237 in European Political Cooperation 




























































































a state, trade concessions and aid flows can remain unaffected. The EU 
delivered two démarches to Slovakia in 1994 and 1995, reiterating that 
Slovakia’s relations with the EU depended on progress in implementing 
democratic reforms, but Slovakia still receives PHARE aid, its Europe 
agreement has not been altered, and it participates in the pre-accession strategy, 
which is to help prepare it for EU membership. Aid can even serve as an 
alternative to negative measures: in June 1996, the Council supported aid to 
improve the human rights situation in East Timor, but has not imposed negative 
measures on Indonesia over the issue.sg
Human rights issues are raised in political dialogue meetings (in the 
context of association or cooperation agreements). In addition, conducting a 
"critical dialogue" on human rights is a way for the EU to express its 
displeasure with a particular situation. From the Edinburgh European Council 
in December 1992 until April 1997, for example, the Union was engaged in a 
critical dialogue with Iran.6" The dialogue with Iran, however did not succeed 
in persuading Iran to respect human rights and behave more responsibly in
V'CFSP Common Position on East Timor, in OJ L 168, 6 July 1996.
""In April 1997, the EU suspended the critical dialogue, after a German 
court found that the Iranian regime had ordered the 1992 assassination of four 




























































































international affairs.61 In 1995, the EU entered into a human rights dialogue 
with China (at China’s request).62
Arms embargoes have been imposed on third countries because of 
violations of human rights and democratic principles. Following the execution 
of writer Ken Saro-Wiwa, the EU imposed an arms embargo on Nigeria (in 
November 1995). The failure to respect the results of the 1990 democratic 
elections in Burma also resulted in an arms embargo on that country.
Breaking off relations that have already been established, however, seems 
to be quite difficult for the EU. Sanctions have, of course, been imposed on 
third states, often in accordance with UN decisions. But unilateral negative 
measures with respect to human rights and democracy seem harder to take. No 
external agreement has been suspended explicitly on the basis of the human 
rights clause.* 6* The human rights clauses state that the priority is to keep
6lMouna Naim, "La dialogue avec l’Europe n’a pas amélioré la situation des 
droits de l’homme en Iran", Le Monde. 10-11 November 1996. The EU did 
manage to get Iran to promise not to encourage anyone to murder writer Salman 
Rushdie, but the promise is not in writing and there is still a bounty on 
Rushdie’s head. "Taking on the Mullahs", The Economist. 18 January 1997. 
It should be noted that the US policy of isolating Iran has not worked either. 
Fawaz A. Gerges, "Washington’s Misguided Iran Policy", Survival, vol. 38, no. 
4, Winter 1996-1997.
6General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, "1994 Memorandum to the 
European Parliament on the Activities of the European Union in the Field of 
Human Rights”, document no. 4404/95, 24 January 1995, p. 9.
"'European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence 




























































































agreements operational wherever possible, and a consultation procedure is to be 
followed before taking action.
Table 2 lists the decisions on aid suspension and interruption, taken by the 
Council, because of violations of human rights and democratic principles in the 
1990s.M Frequently, the Community/Union decides to examine each project 
and decide whether it can be financed because it meets basic needs, or to 
suspend new programs but allow ongoing programs to continue. Complete 
suspension of ongoing projects is rare. In any event, humanitarian aid, and 
often aid for non-governmental projects, is still provided.
As can be seen from the table, development cooperation tends to be
interrupted with weak states, such as Sudan and Haiti. With respect to more
V — '
important third states, such as Algeria and Indonesia, the EU relies only on
of respect for democratic principles and human rights in agreements between the 
Community and third countries (COM (95) 0216 - C4-0197/95)", A4-0212/96, 
26 June 1996, p. 9. The first time a Community agreement was denounced was 
on 25 November 1991, when the Council denounced the EC’s cooperation 
agreement with Yugoslavia, as part of a sanctions package in relation to the war 
there. Marc Vaucher, "L’Evolution Récente de la Pratique des Sanctions 
Communautaires à l’Encontre des Etats Tiers”, Revue Trimestrielle de Droit 
Européen, vol. 29, no. 1, January-March 1993, p. 47. To my knowledge, this 
is the only Community agreement that has been denounced thus far.
^Development cooperation with other countries (such as Liberia, Rwanda, 
and Somalia) has been suspended because of the internal security situation there. 
In October 1996, the EP vetoed new financial assistance to Turkey (to have 
been provided under the MEDA regulation and the customs union) because of 
the deteriorating human rights situation there. The EP does not have the power 




























































































démarches and declarations. Even though elections were canceled in Algeria 
in January 1992, the Community and member states only expressed concern 
about the developments, and took no punitive action.6'
Why does the EU seem to be reluctant to impose tough negative 
measures? Commercial interests are certainly part of the reason why sanctions 
against China have not been reconsidered since 1990.66 In fact, in April 1997, 
several EU member states refused to support a resolution condemning China in 
the UN Commission on Human Rights, which had been jointly supported by the 
member states every year since 1989. The reason apparently is that several 
states, including France, were
'"Of course, this could be a particular case, because a victory for the Islamic 
Salvation Front was widely considered the worst of two evils.
“ See Steven Weber, "European Union Conditionality", in Barry 
Eichengreen, Jeffry Frieden, and Jurgen von Hagen, eds., Politics and 




























































































Table 2: Cases of Aid Suspension/Interruption
Country Action Taken Reason
Comores 1995: cooperation slowed until 
elections
coup d’etat
Equatorial Guinea since 1992: no significant 
cooperation operation implemented
serious violations of 
human rights
Gambia since 1994: cooperation activities 
maintained if meet basic needs
coup d’etat




Haiti 1991: cooperation suspended 
(resumed in 1994 with elections)
coup d’etat
Kenya 1991: aid suspended (resumed in 
1993. but no aid for structural 
adjustment)
lack of progress in 
political field
Malawi 1992: almost total aid freeze (aid 
resumed after 1993 referendum)
no progress in political 
field
Niger Jan. 1996: aid suspended for six 
months
coup d’etat
Nigeria 1993: review new aid programs on 
case-by-case basis; November 1995: 
cooperation suspended
lack of democracy; 
execution of Ken Saro- 
Wiwa
Sudan since 1990: new aid projects 
suspended
civil war; human rights 
violations




Zaire since 1992: cooperation suspended 
(aid in 1994 for Rwandan refugees)
setbacks in
democratization process
Sources: EU Bulletin; SEC (92) 1915 final; COM (94) 42 final; European Commission. EU-ACP 
Coopération 1993 (Special Issue of the ACP-EU Courrier), 1994; EU-ACP Cooperation in 1994: 
European Commission, "Financial Cooperation under the Lomé Conventions: Review of Aid at End 
of 1993". Development, no. 79, March 1995; European Commission, "La Coopération Financière dans 




























































































interested in smoothing relations with China so that important commercial deals 
could be concluded.67 The EU’s critical dialogue with Iran left the member 
states free to import Iranian oil; oil was also not included in the list of sanctions 
imposed on Nigeria in 1995.
The need to reach a compromise among the member states can entail 
backing away from strong negative measures. Decision-making procedures 
allow plenty of opportunity for member states to block them. Under Maastricht 
Treaty article 228a, to impose economic sanctions, there must first be a CFSP 
common position, and then an implementing decision under the Community’s 
Common Commercial Policy. Joint diplomatic sanctions (including arms 
embargoes) are decided on in CFSP (unanimously). The partial suspension of 
commercial concessions or cooperation programs can be decided by the 
Commission autonomously. Mixed agreements (those that are concluded by 
both the Council and the member states* 6*) must be altered by decision of all 
the member states and the Council. To suspend a Community agreement, the 
Council takes a decision after receiving a Commission proposal to that effect, 
but does not need the EP’s assent. To cancel a Community agreement, the EP’s
'"Europa divisa sui diritti umani: nessun accordo contro la Cina", La 
8 Aprii 1997.
6*Such agreements contain provisions that do not fall under the Community’s 





























































































assent is usually also needed.69
The delaying of agreements can reflect the interests of one member state 
in impeding the development of relations with a third country. This can happen 
when unanimity is required to proceed with a positive measure. For example, 
Greece has frequently slowed the development of relations with Turkey, 
ostensibly over human rights abuses.70 Portugal is blocking a new EU-ASEAN 
cooperation agreement over the East Timor issue. But such objections have not 
been enough to prompt the EU to break off relations, which likewise requires 
unanimity. The EU’s "message" is thus unclear.
There are also more profound objections to the use of negative measures. 
There is some opposition within the EU to applying strict conditionality because 
it would isolate those states that most needed aid and ties with the EU and 
generate instability. For example, leaving some CEECs out of the first round 
of EU enlargement eastwards could potentially be destabilizing for the 
discouraged "outsiders".71 Integration, dialogue, and trade should be used to 
.engender democracy, economic reforms and "good behavior". In addition, the 
EU cannot exercise influence if it has no ties to the country concerned.
MSee EP Report A4-0212/96, p. 17.
'"See "Two-faced", The Economist. 26 October 1996.
''Likewise, some observers charge that the ambiguity of the EU’s relations 
with Turkey (an applicant state) has contributed to political instability in the 




























































































These dilemmas were evident in the debates over the response to the 
Russian intervention in Chechnya in December 1994. In early 1995, the EU 
delayed the conclusion of an interim trade agreement with Russia and insisted 
that Russia accept an international monitoring mission in Chechnya; by June, the 
EU had decided to proceed with the agreement even though fighting was still 
raging. The view that Russia should be integrated into Western institutions and 
cooperation networks prevailed over the view that it should be coerced into 
stopping the fighting.72
Fostering interdependence and dialogue can have a positive influence. 
But a preference for carrots opens the EU up to charges of complicity and 
appeasement.7’ The EP has criticized the apparent subjectivity and 
inconsistency in the EU’s application of conditionality: "So far, there is 
sufficient evidence of the EU bodies applying double standards in reacting to 
human rights abuses in different countries depending on their economic and 
strategic potential. Saudi Arabia compared with Iraq might suffice as 
example."74 Sanctions might be necessary just to express the EU's displeasure
72See Andrew Marshall, "EU Ponders the Russian Riddle", The 
Independent. 18 March 1996.
7,A former CIA director criticizes the ’Franco-German’ approach to "wink 
at Tehran’s support for terrorism and rationalise, in effect, appeasement of it.” 
R. James Woolsey, "Appeasement Will Only Encourage Iran", Survival, vol. 
38, no. 4, Winter 1996-1997, p. 19.




























































































with a county’s behavior.
IV. Conclusion
Clearly, the EU’s use of conditionality could be more systematic and 
coherent than it is now. The answer to the question, "to what extent does the 
EU actually apply conditionality?", is that it depends. What emerges from a 
cursory examination of its application of conditionality is that countries that are 
considered important for commercial or political purposes generally do not 
suffer, or suffer less, from negative measures.
But there is more to the story than that. There is a debate about what 
strategies are most effective to promote human rights and democracy, and there 
are doubts about the desirability and effectiveness of using negative 
conditionality. There is evidently disagreement about how to implement the 
initial agreement that human rights and democratic principles are an important 
element in the EU’s foreign relations. Nonetheless, conditionality is applied 
inconsistently, even if this may be due (in some cases) to a well-founded 
aversion to negative measures and sanctions. And this inconsistency could 
reduce the potential for the EU to reach its objective of encouraging human 
rights and democracy.
It is, however, still significant that human rights and democracy have 




























































































not. If commercial or strategic interests were the primary concern for the 
Union's external relations, then there would have been no need or desire to 
develop such a far-reaching human rights policy. While the norm of
conditionality may not always trump other considerations, the EU is nonetheless 
at the front of efforts to make it illegitimate to violate human rights and conduct 
undemocratic politics. By adopting conditionality as a norm guiding foreign 
policy behavior, the EU has at least agreed that now it can act on the basis of 
considerations of human rights and democratic principles.

























































































































































































EUI Working Papers are published and distributed by the 
European University Institute, Florence
Copies can be obtained free of charge 
-  depending on the availability of stocks -  from:
The Publications Officer 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy



























































































Publications of the European University Institute
To The Publications Officer
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) -  Italy 
Telefax No: +39/55/4685 636 
e-mail: publish@datacomm.iue.it 
http://www.iue.it/
From N am e.................................................................
Address.............................................................
□  Please send me a complete list of EUI Working Papers
□  Please send me a complete list of EUI book publications
□  Please send me the EUI brochure Academic Year 1998/99
Please send me the following EUI Working Paper(s):
No, Author ..........................................................................
T itle : ..........................................................................
No, Author ..........................................................................
T it le : ..........................................................................
No, Author ..........................................................................
T itle : ..........................................................................
No, Author ..........................................................................







































































































The Accommodation of Diversity in
European Policy Making and its
Outcomes: Regulatory Policy as a
Patchwork
SPS No. 96/3 
Daniel VERDIER
Gerschenkron on his Head: Banking 
Structures in 19th-Century Europe, 
North America, and Australasia
SPS No. 96/4
Daniel VERDIER 
Democratization and Trade 




Democratic Convergence and Free
Trade
SPS No. 96/6 
Christian JOPPKE
Nation-Building after World War Two: 
Postcolonialism. Postcommunism, and 
Postfascism Compared
SPS No. 96/7 
Takis S. PAPPAS 
Grand Design, Narrow Choices: 
Conservatives and Democracy in 
Southern Europe
SPS No. 96/8
Arpâd SZAKOLCZAI/Làszlô FÜSTÔS 
Value Systems in Axial Moments: A 
Comparative Analysis of 24 European 
Countries
SPS No. 96/9 
Arpdd SZAKOLCZAI 
In a Permanent State of Transition: 
Theorising the East European Condition
SPS No. 96/10 
Paolo DONATI
Environmentalism, Postmaterialism, and 




Durkheim, Weber and Parsons and the
Founding Experiences of Sociology
SPS No. 96/12 
Christoph KNILL 
Patterns of European Policy 




Conceptualising the Left-Right 




The Theories of Ethnic Entrepreneur- 
ship, and the Alternative Arguments of 
Social Action and Network Analysis
SPS No. 97/2 
Harald WYDRA
Imitating Capitalism and Democracy at 
a Distance - Identifying with Images in 
the Polish Transition
SPS No. 97/3 
Martin J. BULL
From PDS to Cosa 2 : The Second 
Congress of the Democratic Party of the 
Left
. SPS No. 97/4 
Philippe C. SCHMITTER/
Jurgen R. GROTE
The Corporatist Sisyphus: Past, Present 
& Future




























































































V ^iP S N o.97 /5  
Agnes HORVATH 
The Political Psychology of Trickster- 
O j'jQ  Clown: An Analytical Experiment 
Around Communism as a Myth
SPS No. 97/6
Giovanni CAPOCCIA 
Electoral Abuse in PR Systems: Old and 
New Territorial Distortions in the 
German Electoral System
SPS No. 97/7
Karen Elizabeth SMITH 
The Use of Political Conditionality in 
the EU’s Relations with Third 
Countries: How Effective?
* out of print
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
..1 1
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
